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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-1791 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
MANUEL GONZALEZ 
   Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-14-cr-00015-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Luis Felipe Restrepo 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SHWARTZ, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.  
(Filed:  November 13, 2015) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Manuel Gonzalez appeals an order denying his motion to suppress evidence 
recovered from his vehicle.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I 
 Philadelphia Police Officer Jonathan Czapor, a thirteen-year veteran of the police 
force, has led hundreds of narcotics surveillance operations, including at least 100 
operations at the intersection of Marshall and Venango Streets in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania (the “Intersection”), a location known for violence and illegal drug activity.  
During prior surveillance operations at the Intersection, Czapor observed drug sales and 
learned that the street-level dealers “work in conjunction with several other individuals,” 
App. 42, including “a lookout,” App. 43, “a re-up person, . . . [who] would . . . provide 
the street level dealer with more product to sell,” App. 43, and “a money person . . . 
[who] will come around and collect the proceeds from that street level dealer on a routine 
basis.”  App. 43. 
 On August 7, 2013, Czapor and his partner, Officer Ephrain Torres, were 
patrolling the area surrounding the Intersection.  Several backup officers were assigned to 
patrol the vicinity, including Officer Eric Crawford, who was ready to “stop” and 
“arrest[] . . . any individuals that Officer Czapor observed engaged in narcotics activity.”  
App. 74. 
 At approximately 10:00 p.m., Czapor and Torres observed Wayne and Kenneth 
Griffin standing by the Intersection engaged in conversation in front of a closed store, 
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and decided to establish surveillance.1  “A short while later,” they saw Wayne walk a 
short distance on Venango Street.  App. 45. 
 At 10:10 p.m., Czapor observed a green Saturn park, and saw the driver, Danis 
Velasquez, exit the car and speak with Kenneth, who pointed Velasquez in Wayne’s 
direction.  After Velasquez and Wayne engaged in a brief discussion, Wayne “removed a 
cigarette pack from his front pocket,” opened the box, and handed Velasquez “small 
items in exchange for United States currency.”  App. 46.  Wayne then pocketed the 
money and the cigarette box, and Velasquez returned to the Saturn and departed.  Czapor, 
who was using binoculars to surveil the encounter, knew Wayne had not handed 
Velasquez a cigarette, and “believed that [he] had just observed a narcotics transaction.”  
App. 47.  He then provided the backup officers with Velasquez’s physical and vehicle 
description, and “[w]ithin a minute or so Officer Crawford . . . relayed to [Czapor] that he 
had . . . stopped that vehicle and arrested [the driver] after recovering one purple packet 
of alleged powder cocaine.”  App. 48. 
 The surveillance continued.  Around 10:20 p.m., Czapor saw a gray Buick sedan 
park at the corner of the Intersection, and the driver, Louis Martinez, exit the car and 
engage in a similar transaction with the Griffins, with Martinez exchanging money for a 
small packet from Wayne, before driving away.  Czapor again “provide[d] backup 
officers with the description” of the vehicle, and another backup officer, Officer Logan, 
stopped the Buick and relayed to Czapor that he had arrested Martinez “after recovering 
one purple packet of cocaine.”  App. 50. 
                                              
 1 For convenience, we will refer to each Griffin by his first name. 
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 Czapor continued to surveil the Intersection, and at approximately 10:30 p.m., he 
“observed a black Ford Taurus arrive at the intersection” with three occupants and 
“park[] directly in front of [the officers’] surveillance vehicle.”  Id.  Czapor observed the 
driver of the Taurus, appellant Manuel Gonzalez, exit the driver’s seat.  Kenneth 
“greet[ed] . . . Gonzalez . . . by giving him a handshake and . . . a half a hug.”  App. 51.  
Kenneth then walked over to Wayne.  Czapor saw Wayne take “stacks of money . . . 
folded in half . . . from various pockets,” App. 67, and hand the bills to Kenneth, who 
then delivered the money to Gonzalez.  Gonzalez returned to the Taurus and drove away.   
 Based on his observations of “how these corners operate,” Czapor “believe[d] that 
[Gonzalez] had picked up the proceeds” of the drug transactions, and accordingly 
“provided backup officers with [Gonzalez’s] description to have [him] stopped.”  App. 
51-52.  Czapor described Gonzalez as a “Hispanic male wearing a blue tee-shirt and blue 
jeans driving a black Ford Taurus.”  App. 55.  Crawford testified that he received this 
information from Czapor2 and, “within three minutes,” App. 90, saw a black Taurus, and 
stopped the car.3     
 Crawford exited his vehicle, leaving the spotlights on, and “quickly approached” 
the Taurus, App. 78, to see if the driver matched the description Czapor provided.  “[B]y 
                                              
 2 According to Crawford, Czapor also told him that Gonzalez had received money 
and the direction he was traveling, but Czapor testified only that he gave a description of 
the vehicle and driver, and did not mention these other details.    
 3 Crawford testified he was not explicitly told that the driver of the Taurus was 
engaged in criminal activity, but that he “would only receive the information if that 
individual was involved in criminal activity, specifically related to narcotics.  That’s what 
[his] assignment was that day to be out there for.  That was what Officer Czapor’s 
assignment was.  So he wouldn’t have given it to me if it wasn’t related to narcotics.”  
App. 94 
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the time [Crawford] reached the trunk of [the Taurus],” flashlight in hand, Crawford 
“could see [a] gun in [the driver’s] right hand leaned over the seat.”  App. 82.  Crawford 
ordered the driver, Gonzalez, to drop the gun.  One of the passengers took the gun from 
Gonzalez, and Crawford then ordered the passenger to drop the gun.  The passenger 
eventually complied.  Thereafter, the officers recovered a loaded black Ruger 9 
millimeter handgun from the car and $1,019 from Gonzalez’s pocket.  Gonzalez was 
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1). 
 Gonzalez moved to suppress the gun recovered from his car on the ground that 
Crawford lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car.  The District Court held a 
suppression hearing, and denied the motion, finding “that Officer Czapor had ‘a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot,’ justifying the 
investigatory stop of Mr. Gonzalez’s car.”  App. 4 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968))).   
 The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Gonzalez guilty of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon.  Gonzalez appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the 
firearm. 
II4 
                                              
 4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the denial of a motion to suppress 
“under a mixed standard of review, exercising plenary review over legal determinations 
and reviewing findings of fact for clear error.”  United States v. Navedo, 694 F.3d 463, 
467 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236-37 (3d Cir. 
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 This appeal requires us to address (1) whether Czapor had reasonable suspicion 
that Gonzalez was engaged in criminal activity to justify a Terry stop; and (2) if so, 
whether that knowledge may be imputed to Crawford under the “collective knowledge” 
doctrine. 
 Terry allows law enforcement officers to conduct a brief stop of an individual if 
there is reasonable suspicion to believe the individual may be engaged in criminal 
activity.  See 392 U.S. at 30.  The Terry doctrine applies equally to vehicle stops.  See 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985); United States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 
170, 174 (3d Cir. 2009).  A determination of whether reasonable suspicion exists depends 
on the “totality of the circumstances,” and must be based on a “reasonable, articulable 
suspicion” that exists before the stop occurs.  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, 127.  A 
reasonable suspicion determination requires “more than an inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.”  Id. at 123-24 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  While the test for reasonable suspicion is an objective one, we “allow[] officers 
to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and 
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an 
untrained person.”  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 Czapor’s observations that night, his knowledge of past activity at the Intersection, 
and his investigative inferences provided him with reasonable suspicion to believe 
                                                                                                                                                  
2012)).  We review reasonable suspicion determinations de novo.  United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002). 
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Gonzalez was involved in illegal activity.  First, Gonzalez was present at a late hour in a 
high-crime area known for drug activity.  See United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 
561 (3d Cir. 2006) (presence in a high crime area and time of day are relevant 
considerations in a Terry analysis).  Second, Czapor observed Gonzalez warmly greet 
Kenneth, and then take a stack of money from Wayne who, just minutes earlier, had 
collected money in two drug transactions.  These events, viewed in connection with 
Czapor’s extensive experience and knowledge, supported the District Court’s finding that 
reasonable suspicion existed to believe Gonzalez was involved in this drug activity. 
 Gonzalez argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion because none of the 
activities Czapor observed were illegal.  We have noted, however, that reasonable 
suspicion may be found even by observing “exclusively legal activity.”  United States v. 
Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000).  Indeed, a proper evaluation of the totality of 
the circumstances cannot be reduced to distinct factors taken in isolation, and a number 
of activities, even if entirely legal and innocent themselves, may “warrant[] further 
investigation.”  Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 
(1989)).  Although there may be nothing inherently illegal about greeting someone on the 
street and exchanging money, when viewed from the perspective of a veteran narcotics 
officer who sees such activity late at night on a street known for drug activity taking 
place within minutes of multiple drug transactions, the officers had sufficient facts to 
support a reasonable, individualized suspicion that the person receiving the money was 
engaged in criminal activity.  
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 While such facts provided Czapor with reasonable suspicion that Gonzalez was 
engaged in criminal activity, the stop of Gonzalez’s car is only valid if Crawford also had 
proper grounds for pulling Gonzalez over.  Thus, we must decide whether Czapor’s 
reasonable suspicion may be imputed to Crawford under the “collective knowledge” 
doctrine. 
 The collective knowledge doctrine allows imputation of one law enforcement 
officer’s knowledge to another officer who actually makes a stop, even if the latter does 
not possess all relevant facts.  See United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 745 (3d Cir. 
2010); see also United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[R]easonable suspicion can be based on information gathered from another person.”).  
The doctrine allows the “police . . . to act on the strength” of work done by fellow 
officers.  See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971).  Under the rule, 
determinations concerning the existence of reasonable suspicion can be made based on 
the knowledge of the officer conveying the information, not on “whether those relying on 
the [information] were themselves aware of the specific facts which led their colleagues 
to seek their assistance.”  Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231.  Thus, “[t]he legality of a seizure 
based solely on statements issued by fellow officers depends on whether the officers who 
issued the statements possessed the requisite basis to seize the suspect.”  Rogers v. 
Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231-32) (emphasis 
omitted).  As we have already determined, Czapor, the issuing officer, possessed the 
requisite reasonable suspicion.  
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 Additionally, in communicating a description of both Gonzalez and the car he was 
driving, Czapor provided sufficient information to impute his knowledge and reasonable 
suspicion to Crawford.  While we have held that exceedingly vague descriptions can 
preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion, Czapor’s description of the color, make, and 
model of the car and description of Gonzalez’s race, gender, and clothing provided 
Crawford with enough information to locate and stop Gonzalez’s car.5  Cf. United States 
v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2006) (generic description of two African-
American males was insufficient to provide a basis for officer’s stop); United States v. 
Kithcart, 134 F.3d 529, 530-32 (3d Cir. 1998) (description was insufficient to justify a 
stop of a car with one apparent occupant where officer told to look for “two black males 
in a black sports car”).  App. 53, 55.  Czapor’s communication allowed Crawford not 
only to seek a specific car in the nearby area, but also to quickly identify the person 
Czapor observed.6  App. 75, 90.  That Czapor failed to provide Crawford with a greater 
description of the facts supporting his suspicion does not change this conclusion.  
Crawford had sufficient information about the car he was to stop and its occupant, and 
understood the nature of both the surveillance operation and his role to arrest “any 
individuals that Officer Czapor observed engaged in narcotics activity.”  App. 74.  As a 
                                              
 5 Czapor’s account of the communications alone, even without the details 
Crawford recounted concerning the direction of Gonzalez’s travel or his receipt of 
money, provided Crawford with reasonable suspicion to stop Gonzalez. 
 6 Crawford testified that although he had been given a physical description of 
Gonzalez, he did not see the driver until after stopping the Taurus.  This distinction, 
however, does not change our analysis because Crawford acted properly in stopping a 
vehicle matching the specific make, model, and color he was provided, and acted 
immediately to confirm he had stopped the correct suspect. 
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result, it was not necessary to require Czapor to “communicate to [Crawford] every fact 
that could be pertinent in a subsequent reasonable suspicion analysis.”  Whitfield, 634 
F.3d at 746.  Therefore, Czapor’s information and his communication to Crawford allows 
us to impute his reasonable suspicion to Crawford, and as a result, Crawford’s stop of 
Gonzalez was lawful.7 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
                                              
 7 Gonzalez additionally argues that the collective knowledge doctrine should not 
apply because this was not a “fast-paced, dynamic situation” such as the one in Whitfield.  
This argument is unavailing.  This situation was fast-paced and dynamic given the series 
of events observed over a thirty-minute period during the surveillance operation.  In any 
event, nothing in Whitfield or the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence limits the collective 
knowledge doctrine to such situations.  See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 223-24 (upholding 
application where six days passed between the bulletin being sent and Hensley’s arrest).  
